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Information and its Presentation: 
Treatment Effects in Low-Information vs. High-Information Experiments1 
Over the past 50 years, one of the major areas of growth within political science has been 
in political psychology. The increasing use of psychological theories to explain political behavior 
has revolutionized the discipline, altering how we think about political activity and how we 
conduct political science research. Along with the advent of new psychological theories, we have 
also seen the rise of new research methods, particularly experiments that allow us to test those 
theories (for summaries of the growth of experimental methods, see McDermott 2002; and 
Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia 2006). Like all methods, experimental research has 
strengths and weaknesses. Most notably, experiments excel in attributing causality, but typically 
suffer from questionable external validity. Further, two different types of experiments exist, each 
of which deals with this tradeoff differently: laboratory studies that maximize control and causal 
inferences at the expense of external validity, and field studies that increase external validity by 
weakening control over the research setting (Gerber and Green 2012; Morton and Williams 2010).  
In this article, we identify a middle ground and assess whether presenting an 
experimental treatment in a more realistic, high-information laboratory environment produces 
different results than those that come from more commonly used, low-information laboratory 
procedures, and then examine why those differences occur. In particular, we examine whether 
manipulations of candidate gender have different effects on candidate evaluation when they are 
embedded within an informationally-complex “campaign” than when they are presented in the 
more traditional low-information survey or “vignette”-style experiment. To do this, we use the 
Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE), an online platform that allows researchers to 
simulate the rich and constantly-changing information environment of real-world campaigns. 
 
1 The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are 
available at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse 
Network, at:  doi:10.7910/DVN/TGFAOH  
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While this is not the first study to use or discuss DPTE (see Lau and Redlawsk 1997 and 
2006 for originating work), this is the first attempt to determine whether DPTE studies produce 
substantively different results from traditional survey experiments, which present subjects only 
with short vignettes to consider.2 We use DPTE to examine whether variations in the presentation 
of information in an experiment create differences in subjects’ evaluations of two candidates. We 
argue here that high-information studies help to correct for exaggerated treatment effects that are 
often attributed to vignette-style experiments, while still allowing scholars to randomly assign 
subjects to different conditions and expose them to desired treatments. To do so, we focus upon 
three simple manipulations: the manner in which information about the candidates is presented 
(statically or dynamically) the amount of information presented about the candidates (low- vs. 
high-information) and the gender of the subject’s in-party candidate. 
Laboratory Experiments in Political Science 
Laboratory experiments have emerged as a leading technique to study topics that are 
difficult to manipulate in the real world, such as the effects that candidate characteristics like 
gender have upon voter evaluations of those candidates. Vignette-style experiments are relatively 
easy to design, low-cost and easy to field, and permit clear, strong causal inferences. Use of this 
design has proliferated in the past several decades, adding a great deal to what we know about 
political psychology (early paradigm setting examples studying candidate gender include 
Sigelman and Sigelman 1982; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a and 1993b). The recent emergence of 
research centers that provide nationally representative samples online (such as YouGov, 
Knowledge Networks, and Survey Sampling International), the creation of large national surveys 
 
2 Please note that by survey experiments, we are referring to any experiment that uses survey 
methods to collect information from subjects before and/or after a treatment where that treatment 
is a static presentation of a small set of information (Mutz 2011). This includes many experiments 
conducted in laboratory settings, online, and embedded within nationally-representative surveys. 
This classification depends upon a study’s procedure, rather than the nature of the sample. We 
also use the term laboratory experiments, which is any experiment in which the entire 
information environment is controlled by the researcher.  
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that researchers can join (such as Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) and 
the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)), as well as the opening of online labor 
pools like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, have meant that survey experiments can now be delivered 
inexpensively to huge, representative samples that grant the ability to generalize results onto the 
broader population (Gilens 2001; Brooks and Geer 2007; Mutz 2011; Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 
2012).  
As they have recently grown in popularity, inevitable methodological counterarguments 
have also developed (see particularly Kinder 2007; Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk 2007; Barabas 
and Jerit 2010). For all their benefits, experiments—even those that are conducted on a 
population-based random sample—provide questionable external validity. This has been 
particularly noted for the vignette-style survey experiments that have become dominant in the 
discipline. Observed treatment effects in such studies seem to be higher than those observed in 
the real world via either field or natural experiments (Barabas and Jerit 2010; Jerit, Barabas and 
Clifford 2013). This is partially unavoidable. All research that studies a proxy dependent variable 
(i.e. a vote for hypothetical candidates in a hypothetical election) necessarily lacks the ability to 
declare a clear connection with the actual dependent variable of interest (i.e. real votes in real 
world elections).  
Further, all experiments force exposure to a treatment while simultaneously limiting 
subjects’ access to other information. In doing so, they create a tightly controlled information 
environment in which causal inferences can be easily made. However, this also makes most 
experimental scenarios decidedly unrealistic (McDermott 2002; Iyengar 2011). For many voters, 
the bare, minimalistic descriptions available in short vignettes may give little reason at all to vote 
for, or against, the candidates. Vote decisions, particularly for high-level state and federal offices, 
are typically much more involved than these minimal information environments allow (Carsey 
and Wright 1998; Highton 2004; McDermott and Jones 2005). Researchers may well find a 
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causal relationship between two variables in a  study like this, but what becomes of that 
relationship in an actual campaign, where candidates present issue stances, make impassioned 
speeches and launch numerous targeted ads aimed at influencing voters? It is possible, perhaps 
even likely, that additional information may alter or completely negate that relationship . By 
restricting the availability of other information, vignette-style experiments create an environment 
in which the limited information subjects can access may produce outsized effects, simply 
because it is the only information available.  
Additionally, by virtue of their design, these experiments immediately measure the 
response to the treatment, preventing any diminishing of the treatment effect over time (Jerit, 
Barabas and Clifford 2013). Treatment effects are not always long-lasting, and the influence that 
any individual piece of information has may decline as time goes on (Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 
1990; Lodge, Steenberger and Brau 1995). A design more concerned with external validity might 
give subjects more time between accessing a treatment and being asked to evaluate a candidate in 
order to allow information to be processed for relevance or importance, as happens during a real 
political campaign. Votes, after all, are still mainly cast on Election Day, permitting voters days, 
weeks or even months of time to digest campaign information. In the low-information, 
immediate-reaction scenarios that short, vignette-style survey experiments create, however, 
treatments are given the “best-case scenario” to produce significant effects.  
This is not to say that such experiments are without value—quite the contrary. Low-
information vignette experiments seem to exaggerate treatment effects, but they generally do not 
find results that are out-of-line with what occurs in more externally-valid field experiments or 
natural experiments (Barabas and Jerit 2010; Jerit, Barabas and Clifford 2013). They have 
repeatedly been shown to be very effective at demonstrating that certain treatments can have an 
effect and that a particular independent variable can influence a dependent variable. A harder 
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question is determining if treatments tend to have effects in the real world, when people have 
other information to consult, and have time to allow the treatment to dissipate.  
For many topics, however, field experiments and natural experiments are not viable 
possibilities, leaving few alternatives to further test the external validity of observed treatment 
effects. Many research questions require scenarios that the real world does not frequently present 
(races with candidates of various races and genders, e.g.) or that are difficult to manipulate in the 
real-world (i.e. the conduct of a campaign or the presentation of a candidate). This leaves some 
form of laboratory or survey experiment as the best option for many research topics.  
Process-Tracing Experiments and Information Processing Theories 
While vignette-style experiments are the most commonly-used form of laboratory 
experiment, other options do exist. Process-tracing experiments ask subjects to make a decision 
between various alternatives by learning about them in a manner that can be observed and 
followed by the researcher. Rather than restricting subjects to a very limited set of information, 
process-tracing studies present a much larger universe of information and monitor how subjects 
opt to learn about the alternatives they are asked to choose between. The goal, rather than 
providing a small set of information that all subjects view in its entirety, is to provide a larger set 
of information and allow each subject to choose which  information to access. While this may 
lead subjects to view different information from each other, it better replicates how people make 
decisions in the real-world, by choosing what information they wish to encounter.  
The first process-tracing experiments asked people to use a static information board to 
learn relevant information about each possible alternative, typically by flipping over notecards 
tacked to a board (Ericsson and Simon 1980; Payne 1976), while the researcher observed the 
subjects’ behavior (Jacoby, Kohn and Speller, 1974; Carroll and Johnson, 1990). In order to 
better mimic the dynamic nature of a political campaign, Richard R. Lau and David Redlawsk 
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developed the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE), which recreates the basic premise 
of static information boards in a dynamic, computer-based platform. DPTE places all bits of 
available information into a single, randomized column of “information boxes” that scroll down a 
computer screen, giving subjects the ability to choose the information they would like to click on 
and learn more about. The dynamic nature of this design better resembles a real-world campaign, 
where a great deal of information exists and its presentation and availability are largely out of our 
control, but where we ultimately choose much of what we see. (For a discussion of how dynamic 
environments more closely mimic campaigns, see Lau 1995, Lau and Redlawsk 1997, and Lau 
and Redlawsk 2006).  
Dynamic process tracing techniques have been used to analyze voter decision-making 
(e.g. Redlawsk 2004; Ditonto, Hamilton and Redlawsk 2014; Ditonto 2016), and have been 
demonstrated to produce replicable results using American National Election Study data (see Lau 
and Redlawsk, 1997; Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk 2008). They have not yet, however, been 
compared to similar vignette experiments. We posit that dynamic process tracing studies may 
serve as a middle-ground between shorter vignette-style experiments and the real world – 
allowing researchers the ability to examine causal relationships while also providing a sufficiently 
realistic information environment to produce more externally valid results. More specifically, we 
believe that the design of high-information dynamic process-tracing studies attenuate treatment 
effects in ways that more closely mimic the real world.  
We ground our beliefs in information processing theories, which suggest that the manner 
in which people encounter and process information matters to how they use that information in 
making evaluations and decisions (Simon 1979; Anderson 1983; Hastie 1986; Lau and Redlawsk 
2006). In limiting the availability and presentation of information, short vignette-style 
experiments may exaggerate the role played by the treatments presented. This alters the research 
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question being addressed from “does this information have an effect?” to “can this information 
have an effect?” or perhaps more specifically “can this information have an effect in isolation?” 
 Information processing theory suggests that bytes of information do not have constant, 
persistent effects, but are used to update beliefs relative to what other considerations a person has 
in short-term and working memory (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Lodge and Hamill 
1986; McGraw, Lodge and Stroh 1990; Lau and Redlawsk 2006). An information item may be 
influential on an opinion or not, depending on what other information is immediately available. 
Over time, the effects of new information also tend to dissipate, and may disappear altogether 
(Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990; Lodge, Steenberger and Brau 1995). Thus, there may be great 
differences on the effects of learning a new item of information depending on whether alternative 
information is readily available, or whether the measurement of opinion change occurs 
immediately or some time later.  
All laboratory experiments constrain the universe of information a subject has available. 
While this strengthens causal inferences and makes for a more parsimonious design, it also makes 
whatever information subjects are presented with more likely to be influential. Each individual 
piece of information represents a larger share of the total information available when that 
universe is smaller. In the real world however, all information is encountered among a milieu of 
other considerations and balanced for relevance and importance. A more effective way to assess 
if a treatment actually has an effect in the real world might be to simply present that treatment 
alongside a larger set of other information in the laboratory, in a manner similar to how such 
decisions are typically made, but do so in a manner that allows the researcher to track how much 
and which information is being accessed. 
Test Case—Gender Stereotypes and Candidate Evaluations 
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 In order to test our theory, we examine the role of a candidate’s gender in influencing his 
or her evaluations and electoral fortunes. This is a topic that has received much attention from 
political psychologists over the past 20 years, and about which there is still much contention. A 
great deal of experimental evidence suggests that a candidate’s gender can affect the way voters 
judge him or her, and that women candidates are often subject to a number of stereotypes. For 
example, women candidates are often assumed to have more feminine and communal 
characteristics—they are seen as more compassionate, gentle, warm, cautious, and emotional, for 
example (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1996; Leeper 1991). Also, they are often seen as 
more trustworthy and honest than male candidates (Kahn 1996). At the same time, they are 
stereotyped as less agentic—less competent, less able to handle the emotional demands of high 
office, and lacking in masculine traits like “toughness” (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Carroll and 
Dittmar 2010). Stemming from these assumptions about women’s personality traits, voters often 
assume that women have different areas of policy expertise than men, with particular proficiency 
in “compassion issues” like education, healthcare, poverty, and child care often attributed to 
women candidates. At the same time, more “masculine” issues like crime, the military, and the 
economy are seen as the arena of male politicians (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Cook, Thomas 
and Wilcox 1994; Dolan 2004; Leeper 1991). Finally, women candidates are stereotyped as more 
liberal than male candidates (McDermott 1997, 1998; Koch 2000, 2002).  
 Despite the plethora of experimental evidence that female candidates are subject to 
gender-based stereotypes, other scholars have found that, in real-world scenarios, “when women 
run, women win.” In other words, women are not generally disadvantaged in real elections and 
often win their races as often as men do (Burrell 1994, Seltzer, Newman and Leighton 1997, 
Darcy, et al 1997, Woods 2000, Dolan 2004). Further, several studies have found that expressly 
political factors, such as partisanship matter much more than candidate gender in real-world 
elections (Dolan 2014; Hayes 2011; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009). 
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What accounts for this disconnect between findings that stereotypes exist and those that 
find that gender does not seem to influence electoral outcomes? It has been suggested that part of 
this discrepancy may be methodological in nature (e.g. Dolan 2014, Brooks 2013). The bulk of 
the evidence suggesting that female candidates are evaluated differently from men comes from 
experimental studies, and vignette experiments in particular. At the same time, many of the 
findings that seem to demonstrate that candidate gender doesn’t matter are the results of 
nationally-representative survey research. (though see Brooks 2013 for a prominent example of 
experimental evidence that candidate gender is not relevant). Dolan (2014), for example, uses 
survey data to show that voters generally do not use stereotypes to evaluate female candidates, 
and even if they do, political party matters much more than gender in determining vote decisions.  
Most relevant for our purposes, several studies have found that gender matters 
specifically in low-information elections (McDermott 1997, 1998; Banducci, Karp, Thrasher and 
Rallings 2008; Sapiro 1981; Higgle, Miller, Shields and Johnson 1997; Matson and Fine 2006). 
This is not surprising since psychologists have found that the existence of individuating 
information (that is, substantive information about a particular individual) has the ability to 
minimize the use of stereotypes in person evaluations (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). Voters in low-
information elections have little individuating information to go on, so gender becomes an 
important cue. However, it is possible that candidate gender would matter less, or not at all, if 
other individuating information was available, like a real world campaign.  
To our knowledge, though, no one has yet explicitly compared the effects of candidate 
gender in low- vs. high-information scenarios. It is our contention that most vignette-style 
experiments are essentially simulating low-information elections, whether they intend to or not, 
and that the presentation of a gender manipulation with minimal individuating information will 
lead to very different evaluations than the presentation of that same manipulation along with other 
kinds of information that are generally available during most high-level political campaigns (i.e. 
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Federal and most state-wide offices). If we find that gender matters in low-information conditions 
but not in high-information environments, that may be evidence that the lack of clarity about the 
role of gender in elections has to do with the methods being used by researchers and that the 
information environment in a particular experiment matters a great deal. If gender influences 
candidate evaluations across the board, though (or not at all) that may be evidence that other 
factors are at play, such as the changing nature of gender roles and expectations within society.  
Data and Method 
To test whether different styles of experiments create significantly different experiences 
for subjects, leading to substantively different results, we fielded a 2x2x2 experiment3 in the 
summer of 2015 to approximately 800 subjects4 recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
We used the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) to create four different methods of 
delivering information to our subjects. Each subject proceeded through four “stages” in the 
experiment. They first answered some basic demographic and political questions, then 
participated in a “practice round” to learn how the program worked, then met the candidates in a 
“campaign” and finally cast a vote and evaluated the candidates.  
Information Presentation Manipulations 
Subjects were randomly sorted into four conditions that altered how they learned about 
the two candidates, classified across two axes of information presentation. First, each subject was 
randomly assigned to either a “low” information or “high” information condition. In the low-
information condition, subjects could only learn five facts about each candidate – their education, 
family, prior political experience, religion, and an evaluation of them by the state newspaper’s 
editorial page. The low-information conditions were designed to be similar to previous vignette 
 
3 The archived experiment can be accessed by going to: http://bit.ly/2o7cvws 
4 Demographics of the full sample and of the individual groups can be found in Table X1 in the 
Appendix. 
 11 
experiments and so present the types of background information often found in such studies (in 
particular, we use the information included in Huddy and Terkildsen’s highly influential 1993 
articles). In the high-information condition, subjects could learn the five factors presented in the 
minimal conditions along with 15 additional attributes about each candidate, making them 
reasonably well-defined. 5  
Subjects were also randomly sorted to learn about candidates either statically or 
dynamically. In the static conditions, information was presented in a manner in which subjects 
were easily able to access all of the information that would be available to them. They had 
complete access to available information without limitation. In the dynamic condition, the 
information was presented randomly in a dynamic information board, presenting them with six 
available information boxes at a time. The boxes slowly scrolled down the screen, and for each 
box that scrolled off the bottom of the screen, a new information item replaced it at the top until 
each item had appeared twice. This created a 2x2 set of conditions as displayed below in Figure 1.  
 
In the News Articles condition, subjects were asked to view two news articles, one 
dedicated to each candidate. Again, this condition, in particular, was designed to mimic 
commonly-used survey experiments. Each news article conveyed five attributes of a candidate 
using the same wording available in the other conditions. The articles were both about 200 words 
and were viewable by clicking on a box with the respective candidate’s name and picture. Both 
boxes appeared simultaneously on the screen, and the order of the boxes was randomized 
between subjects. 
 
















The Static Board condition created a computerized version of the classic “notecards on a 
board” process tracing design used in marketing research. It listed the two candidates’ names 
along the top, creating two columns, and then listed the 20 available attributes about the 
candidates along the side of the screen in rows. Below each candidate’s name were a series of 
codes that could be entered that would reveal the relevant attribute about the candidate. Subjects 
would enter a code, view the information, and then return to the static board where they could 
input a new code.  
The dynamic presentation conditions (both low- and high-information) entered subjects 
into a dynamic information board loaded with the available information. Each information box 
listed the candidate’s name and picture, as well as the attribute the box contained. Each 
information item was available two times and the order of items was randomized for each subject. 
The boxes slowly scrolled down the screen and continued to scroll while subjects clicked on 
boxes and read the information inside. All information about the candidates was identical 
between the presentation conditions and differed only in presentation style and availability.  
We propose that the high-information condition is more realistic in mimicking what 
voters face during most federal and statewide campaigns – whether they choose to learn it or not, 
there is a wealth information available. Similarly, we believe that, by design, the dynamic 
conditions are more realistic than the static conditions, making information available to subjects 
without giving them complete control over the information environment and also ultimately 
allowing them to choose the information they access. We can rank the information environments 
in these conditions, then, from simplest to most complex and from least to most realistic: News 
Articles, Low-information Dynamic Board, Static Board, High-Information Dynamic Board.  
Candidate Gender Manipulation 
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We manipulated the gender of the subjects’ in-party candidate6 so that half of the subjects 
viewed a man and half viewed a woman running for their party. We presented this information to 
subjects in three ways. First, we gave the candidates gendered names (Patrick/Patricia Martin for 
the Democrats and James/Jamie Anderson for the Republicans). Second, we associated pictures 
with the candidates and introduced subjects to the two candidates by presenting these pictures and 
the candidate names in an opening campaign synopsis page. We then used those pictures on all 
the information boxes to identify which candidate the box pertained to. Third, we used gendered 
pronouns (he/she, his/her, himself/herself) in the information items to refer to the candidates.  
Hypotheses 
We expect that the presentation (dynamic vs. static) and amount of information (low vs. 
high) will have significant and substantive effects on how subjects experience the study, evaluate 
the candidates, and react to the candidate gender manipulation. Our expectations are as follows:  
H1: Subjects in high-information conditions will be less likely to exhibit treatment effects 
than the low-information conditions. With more information available, we believe that 
the influence of the gender manipulation will be counterbalanced by individuating 
information about the candidates, decreasing or eliminating treatment effects.  
H2: Further, we expect that the dynamic conditions will be less likely to exhibit treatment 
effects than static conditions. Because of the design of the dynamic boards, subjects are 
required to stay in the “campaign” for longer, leaving more time for information effects 
 
6 We only varied the sex of the in-party candidate because we believe that subjects devote more 
time to considering the in-party candidate regardless of which information search strategy they 
adopt (see Lau and Redlawsk 2006 for a fuller explanation). We determined the in-party 
candidate by asking the standard series of party identification questions, where those who 
identified as partisans were sorted into their respective parties along with those who identified 
themselves as “leaning” towards one party. For pure independents, we determined the in-party by 
comparing feeling thermometer ratings for “most Republicans” and “most Democrats.” The 
higher rating determined independent subjects’ in-party candidate. All of our subjects were 
successfully sorted in this way, avoiding the use of any further tie-breaker criteria.  
 14 
to dissipate. We expect that dynamically presented information will accordingly decrease 
the effects of the gender manipulation because they will take more time to complete, 
allowing the influence of any initial gender treatment effect to attenuate.  
H3: Finally, we expect that the level of information available will be more influential 
than the style of presentation. Of the two information presentation manipulations, we 
believe that the availability of information will prove more important than how it is 
presented.  
Thus, taking the above hypotheses together, we expect that treatment effects will be 
strongest in the News Articles group (low-information, static) condition, followed by the Low-
Information Dynamic group, then the Static Board group, while the High-Information Dynamic 
group should produce the weakest treatment effects.  
Results 
 We split our analysis into two sections: the treatment effects found from the candidate 
gender manipulation, and the behavioral differences observed between groups in the various 
conditions. We present the gender manipulation results first, then explain those differences with a 
more detailed explanation of what subjects experienced during the study. 
Gender Cues 
We examine the role of the in-party candidate’s sex by using 10 dependent variables 
commonly used to evaluate candidates, particularly when examining the role of candidate sex. 
First, we use the more general way of measuring affect toward the candidates with the in-party 
candidate’s feeling thermometer score. We also assess subjects’ ratings of their in-party candidate 
on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale, looking at Republicans and Democrats separately. Then, 
we include the subject’s rating of the candidate on four trait assessments covering the in-party 
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candidate’s compassion, competence, leadership and trustworthiness. Next, we use subject ratings 
of the in-party candidate’s ability to handle four types of issues; economic issues, military issues, 
helping the poor and closing the wage gap between men and women.7  In all, this gives us 11 
dependent variables to examine.  
We treat each information group as an independent sample, as our interests are in how 
researchers conducting similar studies using different methods would view their results. Given 
the nature of our samples and dependent variables and to match previously published results, we 
calculate treatment effects using the ttest command in Stata.8 The specific wording of the 
questions used can be viewed in the Appendix.  
We have three substantive findings in Table 1 (below). First, we find that our women 
candidates largely outperform the men, scoring higher in most of our candidate evaluation ratings, 
regardless of treatment group. We will discuss this further in the conclusion of this section. 
Another main finding in table 1 is that the two low-information groups produce many 
more significant findings than do the two high-information groups. The News Articles group 
finds five significant differences in how men and women candidates are evaluated (on 
compassion, competence, trustworthiness, economic issues and the gender wage gap) while the 
Low-Information Dynamic condition produces six significant differences (feeling thermometer, 
compassion, competence, trustworthiness, economic issues and the gender wage gap). In contrast, 
the two maximum information groups barely produce any findings. The Static Board has only one 
 
7 Like the background information available in the low-information conditions, these dependent 
variables were also taken from Huddy and Terkildsen (1993). 
8 We additionally calculate our results using difference in proportion tests using the ranksum 
command in Stata. Our traits and issues questions have only four levels, making difference in 
proportion tests more appropriate. However, previously published results (particularly Huddy and 
Terkildsen 1993a and 1993b) have relied mainly upon difference in means tests, so we report 
those here for consistency. The results are similar and can be viewed in the Appendix in Table X2.   
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significant result (lib-con for Republicans) while the High-Information Dynamic Board has two 
(feeling thermometer and gender wage gap).  
 
Contrary to our expectations however, the dynamic conditions were not less likely to 
produce significant differences, and in fact produced slightly more. The Low-Information Board 
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2.91    
(0.08)
Woman
3.43   
(0.07)
3.36   
(0.07)




(n=200) 5 (n=189) 6 (n=187) 1 (n=200) 2
TE Mean TE Mean TE
Feeling 













News Articles Low-Info Dyn Brd Static Board High-Info Dyn Brd
Mean TE Mean
Lib-Con 
(Democrats) 0.03     
(0.18)
0.12       
(0.19)
0.14       
(0.19)
0.28   
(0.24)
Lib-Con 






-0.41   
(0.33)
-0.22**   
(0.09)
0.00    
(0.11)
-0.13   
(0.10)
Competence
-0.15*    
(0.08)
-0.16*   
(0.09)
0.06   
(0.10)
-0.10   
(0.10)
-0.10   
(0.11)
Trustworth-
iness -0.30***  
(0.05)
-0.25**   
(0.09)
0.04     
(0.10)
-0.02    
(0.11)
-0.07   
(0.11)
Military Issues
0.02    
(0.11)
-0.05    
(0.11)
-0.02   
(0.11)
-0.05   
(0.12)
0.04    
(0.13)
Gender Wage 




-0.02   
(0.10)





Poor -0.17    
(0.10)
-0.14   
(0.10)
-0.02   
(0.12)
Economic 
Issues -0.23**   
(0.09)
-0.24*    
(0.10)
0.07   
(0.10)
Leadership
-.00      
(0.09)
-0.07     
(0.09)
0.11    
(0.09)
Compassion
-0.14*    
(0.08)
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Information Dynamic Board produced 2 significant findings, compared with only 1 for the Static 
Board. While these are not large differences, they are contrary to our expectations. 
Now, imagine that you were a researcher and conducted this study using only one of 
these groups, remembering that, when using the .05 significance level as the cutoff value, we 
would expect to produce about one false positive per 20 tests. Over these 11 tests, there is thus 
nearly an even 50-50 chance of producing at least one spurious significant result for each group.9 
Had we only run either the News Articles or Low-Information Dynamic Board group, we might 
easily reject the possibility that our findings were spurious, because approximately half were 
significant – far more than the expected error rate. However, had we only run the Static Board 
Group or High-Information Dynamic Board, our lackluster findings may lead us to believe that 
candidate sex played no substantial role in candidate evaluation. Notice that the general pattern of 
results does not change much between the four information groups (though the Static Board 
produces seven results, including the one significant finding, that are against the direction of the 
other groups). In the low-information groups, the differences are strong enough to produce 
significant results, while in the high-information groups this is not the case. 
One could argue that this pattern of results was caused by a relatively small sample size 
(although 200 cases per group is hardly small), which would be corrected if only the sample had 
been larger. Perhaps the low-information groups are producing marginally stronger effects and 
with a larger sample size the Static Board and High-Information Dynamic Board groups would 
also produce similar significant results. Given that the general pattern of results we have seen thus 
far has demonstrated minimal differences between the static and dynamic groups, we can address 
 
9 Using multiple dependent variables in this manner necessitates the use of multiple-hypothesis 
correction to account for the increasing likelihood of false positives when running more tests. 
However, our intent here is to view this from the stance of a researcher conducting an initial 
analysis, as opposed to conducting appropriate statistical corrections when reporting results. We 
do conduct and report Holms-Bonferroni corrections (see Holm, 1979; Gaetano, 2013) on all of 
our difference in means and proportions tables in the Appendix (Tables X4, X5, X6 and X7). The 
pattern of results remain the same.   
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this claim by pooling our groups into a binary classification solely based upon the level of 
information subjects were given access to. Doing so doubles the sample size in each group, and 
permits us to test the claim that these differences are simply a result of sample size.  
 
Table 2 (above) replicates the previous t-tests, this time pooling the samples between the 
levels of information subjects had access to. With only two groups to compare, we can also now 
easily show difference-in-difference scores between the various treatment groups. In these tests, 
eight of the low-information group’s tests produce significant differences, compared to only one 
Man 199 63.39 (1.12) 206 66.41 (1.48)
Woman 190 67.28 (1.22) 181 69.41 (1.60)
Man 34 4.68 (0.20) 43 5.40 (0.20)
Woman 41 5.12 (0.14) 51 5.35 (0.16)
Man 129 3.21 (0.09) 123 2.72 (0.12)
Woman 127 3.14 (0.10) 103 2.51 (0.09)
Man 199 3.15 (0.04) 206 3.21 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.33 (0.04) 181 3.28 (0.05)
Man 199 3.31 (0.04) 206 3.35 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.47 (0.04) 181 3.37 (0.05)
Man 199 3.22 (0.04) 206 3.19 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.26 (0.04) 181 3.19 (0.05)
Man 199 3.06 (0.04) 206 3.14 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.34 (0.05) 181 3.13 (0.05)
Man 199 2.95 (0.05) 206 3.09 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.19 (0.05) 181 3.09 (0.05)
Man 199 2.77 (0.05) 206 2.92 (0.05)
Woman 190 2.78 (0.06) 181 2.94 (0.06)
Man 199 3.10 (.05) 206 3.12 (0.06)
Woman 190 3.26 (.05) 181 3.11 (0.06)
Man 199 2.93 (.05) 206 3.03 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.39 (.05) 181 3.18 (0.06)
8 1 3
*** - p<.001;  ** - p<.010; * - p<.050
-0.31**  
(0.11)
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of the high-information group’s. This is a clear indication that the level of information subjects 
have access to drives the results that are produced in experiments. Interestingly, only three of the 
dependent variables produce significantly different treatment effects according to the difference-
in-difference tests.10 This indicates that both types of studies are producing similar treatment 
effects, but that larger variance in the higher-information groups is preventing significant results 
from emerging. This in turn suggests that greater information may be causing some, but perhaps 
not all, subjects within these groups to alter their behavior. 
Conclusions-Gender Analysis 
These findings strongly suggest that the manner in which experiments allow subjects to 
learn about political candidates have serious repercussions for how those candidates are evaluated, 
and what conclusions we draw from the study. The two manipulations in information presentation 
we examine here – the level of information and the presentation style – are not equally influential. 
Supporting our first and third hypotheses, the level of information seems to produce much 
stronger differences and is the factor that drives the results we find. Depending on whether we ran 
this study as a survey experiment – as in the News Articles group – or as a high-information static 
or dynamic processing tracing study, we would draw very different conclusions. Subjects who 
could view more information about our candidates exhibited lower treatment effects, producing 
far fewer significant results. We can safely conclude that the design of the study does influence 
the types of conclusions a researcher is likely to draw and that low-information studies seem 
much more likely to produce significant findings.  
Substantively, most of our results from the low-information conditions are very much in 
line with current literature. Previous experimental evidence would lead us to expect female 
candidates to be rated as more compassionate and trustworthy, and better at handling “feminine” 
 
10 Calculated using the ttesti command in Stata. 
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issues like dealing with the wage gap, and that is indeed what we find in our study. In both low-
information conditions, these findings are statistically significant and in high-information 
conditions the pattern of results is nearly identical, but not significant. However, there are also 
instances in which we find no difference between male and female candidates when we expected 
one to exist (leadership, military issues, helping the poor), and there are also two dependent 
variables for which gender stereotypes seemed to work in the opposite way from what we 
expected (competence and economic issues). Interestingly, these less-expected results are 
consistent with some of the more recent work on gender stereotypes (Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; 
Dolan 2010, e.g.). Dolan (2010), for example, finds no difference in stereotypic evaluations of 
men’s and women’s ability to handle the economy, or in their levels of ambition or assertiveness.  
Women candidates are also rated more highly on feeling thermometer scores in both 
dynamic conditions, which suggests that gender may actually be a net benefit for women 
candidates in our study, regardless of information condition. This is also consistent with a number 
of previous studies (Dolan 2004; Lawless 2004; Dolan 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Ditonto 2016), 
many of which find that women candidates can and do benefit from gender-based stereotypes in 
certain contexts. 
Subject Behavior Results 
We now seek to explain why these differences emerge. What is it about these different 
information presentation styles that lead subjects to behave so differently? We suggest that there 
are three main factors at play: the time subjects spend in the experiment, the level of information 
they encounter, and the importance of the information they view. 
Time  
One way in which differences can manifest in an experimental study is through the time 
subjects spend gathering, reading and considering the information they encounter. Particularly in 
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a study such as this, where the treatment is viewed early on (though reinforced throughout), this 
greater amount of time provides an opportunity for the treatment effect to attenuate naturally. 
Table 3, below, shows the average time subjects took to complete each substage within the 
experiment, and in total to complete the entire study. Clear differences in total time emerge, and 
reviewing the substage information makes it clear that these time differences come from where 
we would expect them to – the practice session and the actual campaigns where subjects are 
exposed to information.  
 
Unsurprisingly, subjects who were in the low-information conditions (News Articles and 
Low-Information Dynamic Board) spent far less time in the study overall, because they had less 
News Articles 200 260.22 (11.97) 1
Low-Info Dyn Brd 189 288.12 (16.43) 1
Static Board 200 291.52 (17.97) 1
High-Info Dyn Brd 187 279.17 (15.38) 1
Total 776 279.44   (7.74)
News Articles 200 148.47    (4.60) 1
Low-Info Dyn Brd 189 176.27    (8.15) 1
Static Board 200 228.02 (13.66) 2
High-Info Dyn Brd 187 166.24    (6.52) 1
Total 776 178.99    (4.48)
News Articles 200 115.02    (5.30) 1
Low-Info Dyn Brd 189 113.83     (3.61) 1
Static Board 200 306.35 (11.34) 3
High-Info Dyn Brd 187 277.12   (6.06) 2
Total 776 202.61    (4.77)
News Articles 200 153.28   (4.99) 1
Low-Info Dyn Brd 189 157.63   (6.68) 1
Static Board 200 162.61   (6.69) 1
High-Info Dyn Brd 187 156.46   (9.71) 1
Total 776 157.40   (3.62)
News Articles 200 680.84 (18.14) 1
Low-Info Dyn Brd 189 739.62 (22.88) 1
Static Board 200 993.05 (31.51) 3
High-Info Dyn Brd 187 882.96 (23.00) 2
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information to view, and thus less to actually do. Subjects in the News Articles group completed 
the study quickest, taking on average about 680 seconds, or 11 minutes. The Low-Information 
Dynamic Board was close to this, at about 740 seconds. While each of the four groups averaged a 
different average completion time, a Scheffe test (using a .05 significance level) demonstrates 
that the two low-information groups were statistically indistinguishable, but were both different 
than the two high-information groups. Interestingly, the Static Board group took significantly 
longer than the High-Information Dynamic Board group, requiring about 993 seconds on average 
compared with 883 seconds. Subjects in these two groups spent much more time learning about 
the candidates. 
While this is due to the amount of information available to subjects, it is also a 
consequence of the design of the overall study. In order to proceed out of each section of the 
experiment, subjects must complete a certain task. In the pre- and post-questionnaire stages, 
subjects all answered the same questions, so predictably took similar amounts of time. In the 
information-providing stages however, subjects necessarily faced different tasks. In the News 
Articles group, subjects were asked to read the two articles, and then were free to progress,11 
while in the Static Board subjects were forced to view at least 5 individual items of information 
of their choice before moving on.12 Thus subjects in the Static Board group could choose to view 
5 items about their in-party candidate and never learn anything about their opponent. Those in the 
News Articles group did not have that option (though they could still open an article and simply 
not read it). The requirements in these two scenarios were information-dependent, forcing 
subjects to encounter a certain number of information items. 
 
11 The program required that both news articles be read, but allowed subjects to read each one as 
many times as they wished. This is what most survey experiments require participants to do.  
12 After viewing 5 items subjects were provided with a special code that would permit them to 
proceed to the post-questionnaire. We decided to put the bar at 5 items because that is equivalent 
to the amount of information available about each candidate in the News Articles condition.  
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While the two static groups were information-dependent, the dynamic information boards 
were time-dependent, and forced subjects to remain within the stage until all of the available 
information had scrolled by.13 This took longer, but did not require subjects to actually view any 
information if they did not wish to. It was possible for subjects to view nothing at all and still 
advance through to the next substage of the study (though no subject actually did this – the 
minimum number of unique items opened was 2, and the minimum number of boxes was 3).  
Information viewed 
The differences in behavior between the information groups are strikingly apparent in the 
level of information about the candidates that those subjects viewed – and somewhat unexpected. 
There are two primary ways to examine the information subjects viewed – based upon the 
number of unique attributes viewed, and by the total number of information items opened. The 
count of unique items viewed records how many different attributes subjects chose to expose 
themselves to – that is, how many pieces of information about the candidates they chose to look 
at. This measure does not take into account if subjects view an item multiple times, but simply 
that they viewed an item at least once. However, subjects will oftentimes return to re-examine 
previously viewed information, meaning that the number of items opened will sometimes be far 
greater than the number of unique items viewed. Examining both measures provides a greater 
window into how subjects learned about the candidates. 
Table 4 (below) shows the differences in the number of unique items viewed and the total 
items opened for each of the information presentation groups. Subjects in the Static Board group, 
despite taking the most amount of time during the Campaign stage, on average viewed the least 
 
13 There are numerous ways to allow subjects to proceed, including allowing them to choose 
when to advance on to the vote decision. We selected to keep them in the “campaign” for its full 
duration to ensure that subjects were in fact able to encounter all of the available information in 
all of the information groups. This replicates the real-world example of a political campaign, 
where most people still wait until Election Day to vote.  
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amount of unique information, about seven items total. A Scheffe test demonstrates that this is 
statistically the same as the Low-Information Dynamic Board, where subjects tended to view 
about eight unique items. This is interesting in that, even though the Static Board group had four 
times the information available as the Low-Information Dynamic Board group, they both viewed 
statistically equally amounts of information. And the Static Information Board group took much 
longer to do so! As a contrast, the High-Information Dynamic Board produced by far the most 
information viewed, at almost 22 attributes viewed; three times the information in less time than 
the Static Board. 
 
Interestingly, participants in the two high-information groups ended up evaluating the 
candidates very similarly, despite massive differences in how much they actually learned about 
them. Members of the Static Board group viewed far less information, on average, than High-
Information Dynamic Board members and yet seemed to evaluate the candidates statistically 
identically. This is a strong indication that it is not necessarily viewing more information that is 
affecting subjects’ evaluations of the candidates, but having access to certain kinds of information, 
and perhaps choosing to view information that is particularly influential.  
It is worth noting that the News Articles Group is in its own Scheffe group, but this is due 
to the absence of variance in the number of items subjects viewed. Because each news article 





11.60      
(0.34)
2
Low-Info Dyn Board 189
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1
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Table 4. Oneway ANOVA's of information viewed, by Information Group
Unique Information Viewed Total Information Items Viewed





must assume that all of the subjects in this condition viewed the 10 available items with no 
variation between subjects. By lumping all of the available information into a single article, we 
have no choice but to assume that subjects fully read and paid attention to every portion of the 
text, even though we cannot verify this. While we can never truly be certain that subjects attend 
to any information they are exposed to (aside from perhaps using eye-tracking software combined 
with recall tests), presenting each piece of information in its own “box” (as the two dynamic 
groups and the Static Board do) lets us know for certain when subjects seek specific information, 
and thus conversely when they are not exposed to an item.  
The pattern of viewing information changes slightly when we consider the total number 
of items opened. Using this metric, we can see that subjects in the Low-Information Dynamic 
Board group viewed more information, on average, than did subjects in the Static Board group, 
despite having much less information available to them. The High-Information Dynamic Board 
group again views much more information than the other conditions, at about 26 items. The News 
Articles group gets a slight boost here, with some subjects choosing to read the articles multiple 
times, raising the average items viewed to 11.60. Contrary to what we might have expected at the 
outset, subjects who had full control over a high-information environment (the Static Board) 
chose to view the fewest items out of all the groups, and were exposed to less information than 
the subjects who had only 25% of that information available to them.  
Type of Information 
A final area in which differences in candidate evaluation can be generated is in the types 
of information subjects viewed. In each of our four conditions, subjects had access to the same 
five background pieces of information about the candidates, which are similar to information 
routinely used in vignette experiments, particularly those studying the effects of candidate 
attributes like gender. In the high-information conditions, we augmented this information with 
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policy stances and general ideological information about the candidates. This allows us to 
compare what information subjects choose to view when they have no control over the 
information environment (News Articles), some control (Dynamic Boards), and total control 
(Static Information Board).  
Table 5 shows the percentage of subjects within each information group who selected to 
view each attribute (for either candidate). We rank the attributes by the percentage of subjects 
within the High-Information Dynamic Board who chose to view the attribute, because this is the 
group that tended to view the most information and we believe to be the most realistic scenario.  
 
What we find is again striking – the five attributes we included in the minimal conditions 
place in the bottom five slots of views in the High-Information Dynamic Board. That is – the 
types of information typically used in survey experiments alongside the treatment is the least 
Table 5. Percentage of subjects viewing attribute, by Information Group








Gun Control Policy - - 26.74% 86.50%
Taxation Policy - - 27.81% 84.50%
Health Care Policy - - 29.95% 84.00%
Abortion Policy - - 46.52% 83.50%
Immigration Policy - - 20.32% 82.50%
Defense Budget - - 18.18% 81.00%
Jobs Policy - - 29.95% 80.50%
Social Philosophy - - 34.76% 80.50%
Terrorism Policy - - 25.67% 79.50%
Crime Policy - - 16.58% 79.00%
Education Policy - - 18.18% 78.00%
Energy Policy - - 8.56% 77.50%
Economic Philosophy - - 46.52% 77.50%
Global Warming Stance - - 37.43% 77.00%
Iran Policy - - 6.95% 76.50%
Religion 100.00% 93.65% 18.72% 73.00%
Editorial About 100.00% 95.24% 10.70% 67.50%
Education 100.00% 92.59% 13.90% 65.50%
Family Background 100.00% 91.01% 5.35% 63.00%
Political Experience 100.00% 97.35% 13.90% 57.00%
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desirable information for our subjects to want to view when given other options. If the intent of 
providing background information of this type in survey experiments is to avoid contaminating 
subjects’ decision-making processes with other considerations, we can now support this as a well-
crafted design – subjects clearly have little interest in background information and do not seem to 
seek it out when making decisions. 
However, this is also a strong indication of why we find such large differences in 
treatment effects between the high- and low-information groups. Background information in itself 
is simply not appealing to subjects in campaign style experiments, and presents little additional 
information for subjects to use when evaluating candidates. The result is that the treatment 
information – in this case the gender of the in-party candidate – is exaggerated in its importance 
because it is important relative to the other information available to draw from when evaluating a 
candidate. This is not to say that the treatment effect in low-information studies is wrong, only 
that it is exaggerated. By denying subjects the ability to access information that they might 
otherwise use to evaluate candidates, low-information studies force subjects to use treatment 
information alone. While the low-information conditions may accurately simulate very low-level 
elections, they certainly do not mimic higher-level national elections, which are those most 
commonly studied by political scientists. 
Subject Behavior Conclusions 
From this examination of how subjects spent their time within the experiment in the four 
information presentation groups, we get a sense of why there are such great differences between 
the findings in the gender cue analysis. We see significant differences by group in the amount of 
time spent in the study, the amount of information accessed, and the type of information that 
subjects cared about. These findings complicate our understanding of experimental design, 
however. Contrary to our expectations, giving subjects access to more information did not 
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guarantee that they looked at more information. The group that took the longest to complete the 
study was also the group that viewed the least amount of information. And yet they acted 
remarkably similar to they High-Information Dynamic Group that viewed much greater amounts 
of information in less time. Given this design, we have little ability to tease out why this is the 
case, but we do now know that this is an important area for follow-up research.  
The larger question we are left with, as researchers, is: which method is best for 
accomplishing our research goals? What we find here is that perhaps there is no single best 
answer. Low-information experiments seem better at determining if treatments can have effects, 
and whether they do in very low-information elections. High-information experiments appear 
better at determining if treatments have effects when subjects have other information at their 
disposal. In a real election, either of these types of studies may best mimic reality, depending 
upon the level of office and the amount of media attention for a particular race. We know that 
candidates running for office do not all have the same ability to inform the electorate about their 
campaigns, creating unique information environments around each office. For presidential 
candidates, information floods the media environment, almost guaranteeing that citizens learn at 
least some attributes about the candidates. In such races, experiments should likely mimic this 
and design high-information studies and we may want to approach low-information designs with 
greater skepticism. 
But not all offices are like this. Lower-ballot elections, such as state legislative races and 
local contests suffer from much lower campaign spending and media attention. In these situations, 
low-information experiments such as survey experiments may be more accurate, because they 
better mimic the information environments that typically exist. Still, we do wonder whether 
restricting information from subjects mimics this situation better than does providing information 
and giving subjects the freedom to choose whether or not they wish to view it. In theory, all 
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citizens can simply Google their local candidates and find out a great deal about them, even if few 
people actually do so.  
General Discussion and Conclusions 
Low-information survey experiments can clearly demonstrate that various treatments can 
produce behavioral effects, and field experiments can clearly demonstrate when effects do occur 
in the real world. The downsides to these two types of experiments are also apparent. Survey 
experiments can lack external validity, and unrealistically bar access to information that might 
diminish treatment effects. Field experiments are, at least in part, dependent on the events of the 
real world, forcing researchers to tailor their research questions to the available political 
environment (it is difficult to imagine how we could have run a field experiment in the scenario 
used here). We believe that high-information laboratory experiments are a possible middle 
ground, where researchers have the freedom to create scenarios they are interested in studying 
and a more realistic environment that allows treatment effects to dissipate.  
The case for high-information process tracing experiments is not perfect, however. 
Among the other findings, we do show that high-information experiments take longer, and thus 
will require larger payments for subject participation. Given confined research budgets, this 
means that such studies will likely draw smaller subject pools, making examining sub-groups 
within the sample more difficult. It is within these sub-groups that the most interesting 
developments are likely to be found in future studies. We suspect (though do not present evidence 
here) that the drop in significant treatment effects is created by some subjects reacting to acquired 
information that allows the treatment to have a weaker effect. We doubt that this happens equally 
to all participants, and believe that this is likely localized to certain subgroups, possibly the most 
politically sophisticated participants who are most likely to process new information and update 
their evaluations in accordance.  
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We see high-information experiments as a useful tool for political scientists, adding an 
additional layer of realism and complexity over traditional vignette-style experiments. Future 
developments can continue this progress, particularly by lengthening the duration of studies (over 
multiple days or weeks, for instance) and testing the effects of a wider variety of types of 
information (topics that subjects gravitate towards vs. those they ignore). This study has 
demonstrated that our variable of interest – candidate gender – did not produce significant 
treatment effects across a variety of methods. However, we believe that is because the effect of 
gender can be moderated by other information. It is less clear if things like partisanship or 
declared ideology would be similarly affected by additional information, unless it was directly 
contradictory. There is still a great deal of room for studying what information is influential to 
voters, and how the overall information environment influences the effect of any single item of 
information. In summary, we believe that by complicating the information environment we can 
create more externally valid studies that will better capture how people learn about and evaluate 
the political world.  
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Dependent Variable Questions 
 
Feeling Thermometer 
Using the “feeling thermometer” that runs between 0 and 100 degrees, where 0 indicates the most 
negative evaluation, 100 the most positive eblauation, and 50 is neutral, how would you evaluate 
XXXXXX on this scale? 
 
Ranges from 0-100, with an interval of 1 
 
Lib-Con 
On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being the most liberal and 7 being the most conservative, how liberal 
or conservative do you think XXXXX? 
 
Ranges from 1-7, with an interval of 1 
 
Traits 
How well would you say the following word describes XXXXX? 
 
(Compassionate, Competent, A Strong Leader, Trustworthy) 
 
1 – Not at all well 
2 – Not very well 
3 – Somewhat well 
4 – Very well 
 
Issues 
How well would you say XXXXX would handle the following issue: 
 
(The economy, The military, Assisting the poor, The wage gap between men and women) 
 
1 – Not at all well 
2 – Not very well 
3 – Somewhat well 





Table X1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
 
To check if there were any differences in group composition according to these factors we 
conducted a multinomial logit analysis including all of the above factors as covariates (including 
Democrat and Republican, but not PartyID). A likelihood ration test with 27 degrees of freedom is 













%	Female 45.60% 46.50% 45.00% 44.40% 46.50% 0.965	
%	Hispanic 9.20% 8.50% 7.90% 7.00% 13.00% 0.169
%	Black 6.70% 5.50% 6.90% 5.90% 8.50% 0.635
%	Republican 21.90% 18.60% 20.30% 19.80% 28.50% 0.068
%	Democrat 62.40% 67.80% 64.70% 62.00% 55.00% 0.055
Mean	age 34.10 34.00 33.80 35.40 33.30 0.212
Mean	Educatio 3.44 3.39 3.44 3.52 3.44 0.492
Mean	Interest 2.98 2.96 2.98 2.99 2.99 0.969
Mean	PID 3.14 3.04 2.98 3.10 3.43 0.065





   
Man 9154 8894 8777 10323
Woman 10946 9062 8802 9777
Man 243 318 277 878
Woman 460 424 427 776
Man 4384 4176 3880 3252
Woman 4796 3205 2906 2853
Man 9081 8825 8906 10690
Woman 11020 9131 8673 9411
Man 9099 9134 9237 10686
Woman 11002 8822 8341 9415
Man 9699 9446 9275 10746
Woman 10401 8510 8304 9355
Man 8487 8775 9136 11028
Woman 11613 9180 8443 9073
Man 8803 8935 9199 10991
Woman 11297 9020 8380 9110
Man 9797 9549 8791 11013
Woman 10304 8406 8787 9088
Man 9140 9323 9046 11312
Woman 10961 8633 8533 8788
Man 7875 8185 8872 10272
Woman 12226 9771 8706 9829
(n=200) 3 (n=189) 5 (n=187) 1 (n=200) 2
*** - p<.001;  ** - p<.010; * - p<.050        
Gender Wage 
Gap 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.862 0.018*
Significant Findings
Military 
Issues 0.899 0.671 0.676 0.705
Helping the 
Poor 0.100 0.261 0.735 0.682
Trustworth-
iness 0.000*** 0.006** 0.636 0.730
Economic 
Issues 0.007** 0.024* 0.415 0.657
Competence
0.072 0.095 0.355 0.198
Leadership
0.891 0.442 0.291 0.267
Lib-Con 
(Democrats) 0.639 0.400 0.909 0.571
Compassion
0.058 0.007** 0.942 0.210
Feeling 
Thermometer 0.146 0.033* 0.678 0.041*
Lib-Con 
(Republicans) 0.158 0.091 0.017* 0.386











   
Man 199 36028 206 38016
Woman 190 39827 181 37062
Man 34 1110 43 2137
Woman 41 1740 51 2328
Man 129 17039 123 14169
Woman 127 14858 103 11483
Man 199 35655 206 38997
Woman 190 40200 181 36082
Man 199 36369 206 39725
Woman 190 39486 181 35353
Man 199 38157 206 39927
Woman 190 37699 181 35151
Man 199 34477 206 40236
Woman 190 41379 181 34842
Man 199 35382 206 40190
Woman 190 40473 181 34888
Man 199 38703 206 39498
Woman 190 37153 181 35580
Man 199 36773 206 40435
Woman 190 39083 181 34643
Man 199 31993 206 38028
Woman 190 43862 181 37051
8 0Significant Findings






























Low Information High Information








63.11    
(1.60)
68.18   
(1.56)






























3.22   
(0.12)
3.20   
(0.13)
2.62    
(0.14)





3.07   
(0.14)
2.48   
(0.10)
2.55   
(0.14)
Man




3.26   
(0.07)
3.17   
(0.07)
Woman
3.34   
(0.06)
3.32   
(0.07)
3.26   
(0.08)
3.30   
(0.08)
Man






3.32   
(0.07)
Woman
3.49   
(0.05)
3.44   
(0.06)
3.32   
(0.07)
3.43   
(0.08)
Man
3.27   
(0.06)
3.17   
(0.06)
3.21   
(0.06)
3.18    
(0.07)
Woman
3.28   
(0.06)
3.24    
(0.06)
3.10   
(0.07)
3.28   
(0.08)
Man
3.04   
(0.06)




3.17   
(0.07)
Woman
3.34   
(0.06)







2.98    
(0.06)
2.92   
(0.07)
3.13   
(0.07)
3.05    
(0.08)
Woman
3.21   
(0.06)
3.16   
(0.07)
3.05   
(0.07)
3.12   
(0.08)
Man
2.74   
(0.07)
2.80    
(0.07)
2.87   
(0.07)
2.95   
(0.08)
Woman
2.72    
(0.08)
2.85   
(0.08)
2.89   
(0.08)
3.00   
(0.09)
Man
3.14   
(0.08)
3.06   
(0.07)
3.16   
(0.09)
3.08    
(0.09)
Woman




3.17   
(0.08)
3.04   
(0.09)
Man
2.96   
(0.07)
2.90    
(0.07)
3.17   
(0.07)
2.91    
(0.08)
Woman
3.43   
(0.07)
3.36   
(0.07)




(n=200) 3 (n=189) 3 (n=187) 0 (n=200) 0Significant Findings
* - p<.050 by Holms-Bonferroni Sequential Correction
Table X4. T-tests and treatment effects of In-Party evaluations, by Information Group
Helping the 
Poor -0.17    
(0.10)
-0.14   
(0.10)
-0.02   
(0.12)
0.04    
(0.13)
Gender Wage 




-0.02   
(0.10)
-0.27     
(0.12)
Economic 
Issues -0.23*   
(0.09)
-0.24    
(0.10)
0.07   
(0.10)
-0.07   
(0.11)
Military 
Issues 0.02    
(0.11)
-0.05    
(0.11)
-0.02   
(0.11)
-0.05   
(0.12)
Leadership
-.00      
(0.09)
-0.07     
(0.09)
0.11    
(0.09)
-0.10   
(0.11)
Trustworth-
iness -0.30*  
(0.05)
-0.25*   
(0.09)
0.04     
(0.10)
-0.02    
(0.11)
Compassion
-0.14    
(0.08)
-0.22*   
(0.09)
0.00    
(0.11)
-0.13   
(0.10)
Competence
-0.15    
(0.08)
-0.16   
(0.09)
0.06   
(0.10)
-0.10   
(0.10)
Lib-Con 




0.88    
(0.39)
-0.41   
(0.33)
Lib-Con 
(Democrats) 0.03     
(0.18)
0.12       
(0.19)
0.14       
(0.19)
0.28   
(0.24)
TE Mean TE Mean TE
Feeling 




0.15   
(3.13)












Man 199 63.39 (1.12) 206 66.41 (1.48)
Woman 190 67.28 (1.22) 181 69.41 (1.60)
Man 34 4.68 (0.20) 43 5.40 (0.20)
Woman 41 5.12 (0.14) 51 5.35 (0.16)
Man 129 3.21 (0.09) 123 2.72 (0.12)
Woman 127 3.14 (0.10) 103 2.51 (0.09)
Man 199 3.15 (0.04) 206 3.21 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.33 (0.04) 181 3.28 (0.05)
Man 199 3.31 (0.04) 206 3.35 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.47 (0.04) 181 3.37 (0.05)
Man 199 3.22 (0.04) 206 3.19 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.26 (0.04) 181 3.19 (0.05)
Man 199 3.06 (0.04) 206 3.14 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.34 (0.05) 181 3.13 (0.05)
Man 199 2.95 (0.05) 206 3.09 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.19 (0.05) 181 3.09 (0.05)
Man 199 2.77 (0.05) 206 2.92 (0.05)
Woman 190 2.78 (0.06) 181 2.94 (0.06)
Man 199 3.10 (.05) 206 3.12 (0.06)
Woman 190 3.26 (.05) 181 3.11 (0.06)
Man 199 2.93 (.05) 206 3.03 (0.05)
Woman 190 3.39 (.05) 181 3.18 (0.06)
5 0 2Significant Findings
*	-	p<.050	by	Holms-Bonferroni	Sequential	Correction
Helping the Poor -0.15     
(0.07)
-0.01   
(0.09)




-0.47*     
(0.07)
-0.15     
(0.08)
-0.31*    
(0.11)
Economic Issues -0.24*    
(0.07)
0.00     
(0.07)
-0.24    
(0.10)
Military Issues -0.01    
(0.08)
-0.03    
(0.08)
-0.02   
(0.11)




-0.05   
(0.09)
Trustworth-iness -0.28*     
(0.06)
-0.14   
(0.07)
-0.29*    
(0.10)
Compassion -0.19*      
(0.06)




Competence -0.16*     
(0.06)






-0.45   
(0.24)






0.07   
(0.13)







-3.90    
(1.65)










Low Information High Information





Man 9154 8894 8777 10323
Woman 10946 9062 8802 9777
Man 243 318 277 878
Woman 460 424 427 776
Man 4384 4176 3880 3252
Woman 4796 3205 2906 2853
Man 9081 8825 8906 10690
Woman 11020 9131 8673 9411
Man 9099 9134 9237 10686
Woman 11002 8822 8341 9415
Man 9699 9446 9275 10746
Woman 10401 8510 8304 9355
Man 8487 8775 9136 11028
Woman 11613 9180 8443 9073
Man 8803 8935 9199 10991
Woman 11297 9020 8380 9110
Man 9797 9549 8791 11013
Woman 10304 8406 8787 9088
Man 9140 9323 9046 11312
Woman 10961 8633 8533 8788
Man 7875 8185 8872 10272
Woman 12226 9771 8706 9829




Poor 0.100 0.261 0.735 0.682
Gender Wage 
Gap 0.000* 0.000* 0.862 0.018
Economic 
Issues 0.007 0.024 0.415 0.657
Military 
Issues 0.899 0.671 0.676 0.705
Leadership
0.891 0.442 0.291 0.267
Trustworth-
iness 0.000* 0.006 0.636 0.730
Compassion
0.058 0.007 0.942 0.210
Competence
0.072 0.095 0.355 0.198
Lib-Con 
(Republicans) 0.158 0.091 0.017 0.386
Lib-Con 























Table X7.Difference in proportion tests on In-Party evaluation measures, by Level of Information manipulation
Man 199 36028 206 38016
Woman 190 39827 181 37062
Man 34 1110 43 2137
Woman 41 1740 51 2328
Man 129 17039 123 14169
Woman 127 14858 103 11483
Man 199 35655 206 38997
Woman 190 40200 181 36082
Man 199 36369 206 39725
Woman 190 39486 181 35353
Man 199 38157 206 39927
Woman 190 37699 181 35151
Man 199 34477 206 40236
Woman 190 41379 181 34842
Man 199 35382 206 40190
Woman 190 40473 181 34888
Man 199 38703 206 39498
Woman 190 37153 181 35580
Man 199 36773 206 40435
Woman 190 39083 181 34643
Man 199 31993 206 38028
































Low Information High Information
N Rank Sum p>|z| N Rank Sum
